

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 109061

12

ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00

NSC-05 BIB-01 /088 R

DRAFTED BY: ACDA/IR: TMCNAMARA

APPROVED BY: C: HSONNENFELDT

PM/DCA: CFLOWERREE

EUR/RPM: GCHRISTIANSON

NSC: SHANDLEY

DOD/ISA: LMICHAEL

DOD/JCS: WWOOD

EUR/CS: SSTEINER(SUBS)

ACDA: AFLOYD

S/S: RKUCHEL

----- 089169

R 092249Z MAY 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN

INFO USCINCEUR

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T STATE 109061

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO

SUBJECT:REQUEST FOR FRG VIEWS ON MBFR VERIFICATION

REF: BONN 01136

1. EMBASSY BONN IS REQUESTED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION IN PHASE I OF MBFR WITH FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH. IN DOING SO, YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 109061

USG IS CURRENTLY STUDYING THE ISSUE AND BELIEVES FRG VIEWS ARE AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THAT STUDY. YOU MAY INFORM FRG THAT IT IS ONLY ALLY WE ARE APPROACHING AT THIS TIME ON THIS ISSUE. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT US STUDY IS NOT COMPLETED

AND IN PARTICULAR THAT WE HAVE NOT YET FULLY ASSESSED THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE MEASURES OUTLINED BELOW. HOWEVER, THESE MEASURES SEEM TO HAVE SOME PROMISE AND THEREFORE WE WOULD APPRECIATE GERMAN REACTIONS REGARDING BOTH THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY AND EFFICACY OF THE MEASURES. IN PARTICULAR, YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT FAILURE TO ELABORATE THE WESTERN POSITION ON VERIFICATION BEFORE WE GET INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO ULTIMATELY NEGOTIATE ANY SUCH MEASURES.

2. THE ALLIES HAVE AGREED IN CM(73)83 THAT NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS. THEY ALSO AGREED TO SEEK AGREEMENT TO OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES. THEY HAVE INFORMED THE EAST IN PLENARY STATEMENTS IN VIENNA THAT THEY WOULD MAKE MORE DETAILED VERIFICATION PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE VERIFICATION BY OBSERVERS. FAILURE TO FOLLOW THIS UP MAY BE INTERPRETED BY THE EAST AS AN INDICATION THAT THE WEST ATTACHES LOW PRIORITY TO THIS SUBJECT.

3. WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS. THE FRG HAS IN RETURN MADE ALLIES AWARE OF THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IT SEES IN MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS AND WE ARE THEREFORE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES.

4. THE FOLLOWING ARE EXAMPLES OF SOME OTHER MEASURES THAT MIGHT BE PROPOSED TO THE EAST FOR VERIFYING AND MONITORING A PHASE I REDUCTION AGREEMENT. THE MEASURES DESCRIBED BELOW WOULD ASSIST IN DETERMINING THAT SOVIET FORCES HAVE IN FACT BEEN WITHDRAWN AND NOT REINTRODUCED. IT SHOULD BE STRESSED THAT WHATEVER NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION MEASURES ARE EVENTUALLY AGREED UPON, THEY WOULD APPLY TO THE ENTIRE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, THUS AVOIDING SINGLING OUT GERMAN TERRITORY. THEY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY ESTABLISH A PRECEDENT FOR INDIGENOUS FORCES IN PHASE II. OF COURSE, NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NTM, ALTHOUGH NOT DISCUSSED BELOW,
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 109061

WILL CONTINUE TO BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS.

A. A PROVISION FOR VERIFYING THAT THE FORCES TO BE REDUCED ARE IN FACT WITHDRAWN. MEASURES INTENDED TO HELP VERIFY WITHDRAWALS SHOULD BE FRAMED TO MAXIMIZE THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR UNILATERAL MEANS. SUCH MEASURES COULD INCLUDE NOTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC UNITS, THEIR STRENGTHS, AND THE NUMBER OF ANY CASUAL PERSONNEL TO BE WITHDRAWN (CARE WOULD BE TAKEN TO AVOID A WESTERN REQUIREMENT TO WITHDRAW BY UNITS AND TO AVOID CEILINGS ON SPECIFIC UNIT TYPES) AND NOTIFICATION OF THE BEGINNING AND END OF WITHDRAWALS. THIS WOULD APPEAR NEGOTIABLE BECAUSE THE EAST ITSELF HAS PROPOSED A PROTOCOL WHICH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES

STATE WOULD LIST THE UNITS TO BE REDUCED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT ALSO STIPULATES THAT THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT WILL INFORM EACH OTHER OF THE BEGINNING AND COMPLETION OF THE MEASURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF FORCES. AN AGREEMENT ALONG THESE LINES COULD ASSIST OUR UNILATERAL VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES, AS COULD EASTERN AGREEMENT THAT A LIST OF THE LOCATIONS AND INSTALLATIONS FROM WHICH WITHDRAWALS ARE MADE WILL BE PROVIDED TO EACH SIDE. WE COULD SEEK AGREEMENT THAT TEMPORARY GROUND OBSERVERS CHECK ON WITHDRAWALS. WE COULD ALSO SEEK AGREEMENT THAT WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE THROUGH DECLARED EXIT/ENTRY POINTS DESCRIBED BELOW.

B, A PROVISION RESTRICTING MOVEMENT OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO AND OUT OF THE REDUCTION AREA TO A FIXED NUMBER OF DECLARED ENTRY AND EXIT POINTS. SUCH A PROVISION WOULD ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES OF WESTERN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT. AS FAR AS WESTERN DESIGNATED ENTRY/EXIT POINTS FOR US FORCES ARE CONCERNED, A MIX OF AIRPORTS AND HARBORS IN THE FRG AND IN THE BENELUX COUNTRIES IS ENVISAGED. A PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE IS THAT THE TOTAL WOULD BE IN THE RANGE OF SIX TO EIGHT. WE WOULD AIM AT INCLUDING THE MAJOR RAIL AND ROAD CROSSINGS FROM THE USSR INTO THE NGA AS WELL AS AIRPORTS. IT SHOULD BE AGREED THAT NO FORCES COULD MOVE INTO OR OUT OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS EXCEPT THROUGH THESE POINTS, ALTHOUGH OCCASIONAL EXCEPTIONS COULD BE PROVIDED FOR.

C. IN ADDITION, A PROVISION GIVING EACH SIDE THE RIGHT TO
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 109061

ESTABLISH INSPECTION POSTS AT EACH OF THE DESIGNATED ENTRY/EXIT POINTS TO OBSERVE WITHDRAWALS, AND, IN THE POST-REDUCTIONS PERIOD, THE MOVEMENT OF US OR SOVIET FORCES INTO AND OUT OF THE AREA. THE FACT THAT OBSERVERS WOULD BE LIMITED TO A SMALL NUMBER OF ENTRY/EXIT POINTS USED OR USABLE BY US FORCES WOULD MINIMIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE EAST TO MONITOR INTERNAL MOVEMENTS OF NON-US NATO FORCES

D. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WORTHWHILE TO ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT ON AERIAL OBSERVATION.

E. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE IDEA OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION AND OUR TECHNICAL EVALUATION LEADS US TO BELIEVE THIS INSPECTION MODE WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE. HOWEVER, THERE COULD BE SOME VALUE AS A BARGAINING CHIP IN A WESTERN PROPOSAL OF A QUOTA OF AUTOMATIC GROUND OBSERVATIONS.

5. WHILE ON BALANCE, WE BELIEVE SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION WILL PROVE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE WEST, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO ANY SYSTEM THAT MIGHT BE PROPOSED. AS EXAMPLES OF THE MANY CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WE ARE WEIGHING AT THIS TIME, WE WOULD LIKE TO

MENTION THE FOLLOWING:

A. THERE WILL BE A CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ALL NATO PARLIAMENTS, INCLUDING THE US CONGRESS, IN THE VERIFICATION ASPECTS OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT.

B. RESTRICTIONS OF LEGAL TROOP MOVEMENTS TO ENTRY/EXIT POINTS COULD ACCOMPLISH TWO THINGS:

- (1) IT WOULD MAKE ANY MOVEMENT THROUGH OTHER ENTRY POINTS ILLEGAL, REQUIRING US TO DETECT ONLY THE FACT OF MOVEMENT THROUGH OTHER POINTS WITHOUT QUANTIFYING ITS IMPACT ON RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS;
- (2) IT COULD FORCE ANY ILLEGAL AND CONCEALED SOVIET TROOP MOVEMENTS INTO POORER ROUTES, THEREBY SLOWING DOWN ANY RAPID TROOP BUILD-UP AND THUS LENGTHENING POTENTIAL WARNING TIME.

C. IF MANNED POSTS AT DESIGNATED POINTS ARE INVOLVED, IT WOULD ENABLE INCREASED ALLOCATION OF INTELLIGENCE COLLEC-
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 109061

TION RESOURCES TO CROSSING POINTS AND LOCS OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY COVERED BY OBSERVATION POSTS.

D. THESE MEASURES WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION BY THOSE ALLIANCE MEMBERS WHO WISHED TO PARTICIPATE.

E. ANY VERIFICATION SCHEME OTHER THAN NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NTM IS LIKELY TO PROVE VERY DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE.

F. THE RELATIVE POLITICAL AND MILITARY EFFECTS ON NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT OF NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED ABOVE WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY ASSESSED INCLUDING ANY POSSIBLE EFFECT ON NON-US NATO FORCES.

6. IN CONCLUSION, EMBASSY BONN SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE CONCEPTS OUTLINED ABOVE DO NOT RPT NOT CONSTITUTE A USG POSITION ON NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION. WE WOULD HOPE, HOWEVER, TO BE ABLE TO FORMULATE A USG POSITION ONCE OUR POLICY REVIEW IS COMPLETED. FRG VIEWS WILL CONSTITUTE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO OUR REVIEW. THUS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY OBSERVATIONS THE FRG CAN OFFER ON PHASE I NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION MEASURES, ESPECIALLY ON THE CONCEPTS OUTLINED ABOVE. KISSINGER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NEGOTIATIONS, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 MAY 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE109061
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: ACDA/IR: TMCNAMARA
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750164-0895
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197505101/baaaajfr.tel
Line Count: 213
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 02 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <02 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <16 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PARM, GE, US, NATO
To: BONN INFO USCINCEUR
MBFR VIENNA
LONDON
NATO
USNMR SHAPE
Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006